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The Role of Critical Infrastructure Modeling 
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Laura J. Steinberg, Nicholas Santella, Corrine B. Zoli 
ABSTRACT  
The events of Hurricane Katrina have 
become a textbook example of system 
failures at multiple and intersecting levels. 
One unexplored dimension of this tragedy 
is the role of infrastructure performance 
data and modeling studies in aiding 
stakeholders in understanding this and 
future crises in order to promote resilience. 
This article presents results from a 
comparative validation study of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
sponsored Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Decision Support System 
(CIPDSS) to offer an interdisciplinary and 
systems-level understanding of resilience. 
Our analysis of Baton Rouge critical 
infrastructures response to one of the 
largest population displacements recorded 
in U.S. history highlights the importance of 
integrating engineering systems and policy 
approaches with critical infrastructure 
protection, planning, and capacity 
building. By using infrastructure 
performance data we were able to address 
which systems in Baton Rouge proved 
resilient and why and determine 
recommendations for effective planning to 
increase critical infrastructure resilience. 
INTRODUCTION: CIPDSS 
Validation Study as an Occasion 
for Monitoring Resilience  
A common definition of resilience is “the 
capability of a system to maintain its 
functions and structure in the face of 
internal and external change and to 
degrade gracefully when it must.”1 This 
deceptively simple definition, however, 
belies longstanding difficulties in 
defining, measuring, and fostering 
resilience in general, particularly in the 
practical context of critical 
infrastructure systems.2 In this article, 
the authors illustrate an approach to the 
challenges of achieving critical 
infrastructure resilience using modeling 
informed by infrastructure performance 
data. Observations are reported from a 
validation study of the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Decision 
Support System model (CIPDSS), a 
simulation tool developed for the 
Science and Technology Directorate of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). This validation study 
considered the effects of a seminal 
disaster for the homeland security 
community – Hurricane Katrina – on 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  
The unprecedented increase in the 
population of Baton Rouge resulting 
from Katrina severely stressed critical 
infrastructures providing an ideal 
opportunity to exercise infrastructure 
modeling tools and observe factors that 
contribute to resilience. The results of 
the study are used to illustrate both the 
potential benefits and myriad challenges 
of modeling critical infrastructure 
resilience. The article first discusses the 
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potential role of critical infrastructure 
modeling in promoting resilience, as 
revealed by the response to Hurricane 
Katrina. Second, we detail the 
methodology used in the validation 
study and summarize the factors 
measured to determine the level of 
infrastructure resilience in Baton Rouge. 
Third, drawing on our own collected 
data, we illustrate the importance of 
these factors by describing the 
performance of key infrastructure 
systems considered in the CIPDSS 
Validation Study. Last, we outline the 
results of our validation study and 
explore resulting insights into 
infrastructure resilience – namely, how 
critical infrastructure resilience can be 
promoted using simulation-based 
analyses.   
As is now well known, Hurricane 
Katrina caused massive destruction, loss 
of life,3 and widespread systems-level 
failures in critical infrastructure, policy 
and political channels of communication 
and decision-making, homeland 
security, and disaster planning.4 The 
contribution of critical infrastructure 
failures to the disastrous conditions 
following Katrina has been the subject of 
significant study, particularly with 
regard to hospital,5  public health,6 and 
telecommunications systems.7 Because 
of these failures, Katrina has become a 
classic example of the dire consequences 
that accompany loss of infrastructure 
systems and, hence, the need for 
resilient infrastructure.8 In fact, the 
importance of resilience for critical 
infrastructure (much of it privately 
owned) has achieved greater recognition 
and analytical interest in large part 
because of recent major disruptions, 
especially Katrina.9   
To a certain degree these matters are 
now federal policy.10 Government 
investigations of the response to 
Hurricane Katrina, such as The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned, for instance, explicitly 
recognized the role that loss of critical 
infrastructure played in the disaster and, 
in turn, the ameliorative role that 
greater use of simulation-based analysis 
may play in improving disaster 
response.11 The document recognized 
“critical infrastructure and impact 
assessment” as one of seventeen critical 
challenges for improved federal 
response, followed by the 
recommendation to enhance capacities 
to “rapidly assess the impact of a 
disaster on critical infrastructure.” The 
report recommended that DHS revise 
the National Response Plan to provide a 
“stronger” role for the Infrastructure 
Support Branch in the National 
Operations Center, which would suggest 
remedial actions, based on the input of 
the National Infrastructure Simulation 
and Analysis Center (NISAC) and other 
entities. Also recommended was 
enlarging NISAC’s capacity for 
modeling-based analysis of critical 
infrastructure, including greater sharing 
of modeling tools, analysis, and data 
among federal agencies. Elsewhere, the 
importance of infrastructure resilience 
has been demonstrated across federal 
agencies with President Obama most 
recently issuing a Presidential 
Proclamation declaring December 2010 
“Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Month,” a time to focus on “delivering 
the necessary information, tools, and 
resources to areas where critical 
infrastructure exists in order to 
maintain and enhance its security and 
resilience.”12  
Given the complexity and 
interdependency of critical 
infrastructure systems, NISAC and 
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other’s efforts at modeling and 
simulation offer important contributions 
to increasing infrastructure resilience.13 
While varied and important work has 
been undertaken, the limited availability 
of data on infrastructure performance 
during disaster conditions has been a 
significant challenge to modeling efforts 
and, thus, to analysis of resilience. This 
challenge has been described in recent 
efforts to develop data collection 
methodologies for natural hazards and 
other events.14 Moreover, while 
modeling and simulation are critically 
important in aiding decision makers’ 
investments in disaster preparedness, to 
be most useful these tools must 
comprise a multidisciplinary approach 
that integrates technological and social 
systems, thereby adding to their 
complexity.15 For example, as this study 
will show, the physical capacity of 
infrastructure may be increased during 
times of stress by strategic changes in 
the practices of the service personnel 
responsible for the infrastructure’s 
functionality.  As a result, efforts to 
develop practical and useful 
infrastructure models for homeland 
security applications have attracted 
considerable research and government 
interest.16   
CIPDSS is one of the modeling and 
analysis tools developed for NISAC by 
Los Alamos, Sandia, and Argonne 
National Laboratories.17 The CIPDSS 
model differs from other modeling tools 
in that it represents a large number 
(fourteen) of critical infrastructures and 
key asset sectors (e.g. public health, 
emergency services, telecom, energy, 
transportation).18 CIPDISS is also 
intended for analysis of high-level 
behavior of metropolitan or regional 
infrastructure, taking into account the 
way disruptions in one sector may 
propagate to other infrastructure 
systems. Modeling is performed using a 
system dynamics methodology where an 
infrastructure system is broken down 
into simple items and processes 
(feedback loops, stocks, and flows), 
which interact to produce complex 
behaviors. A simplified example of these 
components taken from the CIPDSS 
model of road traffic is illustrated in 
Figure 1 (below). In this sub-segment of 
the model, traffic volume (Tro: Traffic) 
is a stock controlled by flows determined 
by the entry and exit rate of vehicles to 
the roadway, which are themselves 
dependent on other variables not 
pictured. A feedback loop exists such 
that the entry rate decreases under 
heavy traffic conditions. The number of 
people successfully completing trips 
(Tro: Trips Completed) is calculated 
from the exit rate. 
Within the CIPDSS model, each 
infrastructure sector is divided into 
subsectors (e.g., road transportation, 
metropolitan rail transportation) 
represented by pages of visual 
programming code (i.e., “views”) 
describing infrastructure behavior at an 
aggregate level. For example, as 
illustrated above, all roads are treated as 
a single system that behaves in a fashion 
similar to an individual road. The total 
CIPDSS model consists of over 100 
views, and these views are connected 
through variables describing major 
interdependencies (e.g. road 
transportation is less efficient without 
electricity for traffic control). Given its 
ability to map the behavior of 
interdependent systems, CIPDSS has 
been applied to complex scenarios such 
as influenza outbreak or the impacts of 
blackouts on telecommunications and 
emergency services.19 CIPDSS was 
intended to meet an initial operating 
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goal of order of magnitude prediction 
accuracy, though improvements are 
ongoing. 
In September 2005, several weeks 
after Hurricane Katrina, CIPDSS 
developers conducted a series of 
simulations, described in an 
accompanying report: CIPDSS Baton 
Rouge Report, Analysis of the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on Baton Rouge.20 
Hurricane Katrina caused one of the 
largest population displacements 
recorded in U.S. history with estimates 
of over 800,000 displaced people.21 
Although direct hurricane impacts on 
Baton Rouge itself were moderate, up to 
250,000 people were displaced to Baton 
Rouge from New Orleans and other 
coastal areas, increasing the city’s 
overall population by 50 percent and 
causing significant strains on local 
critical infrastructure. The CIPDSS 
analysis of the situation was intended to 
both exercise the model, which was at 
the time about halfway though 
development, and provide insight into 
necessary resources and adaptations 
needed in Baton Rouge over a six-month 
planning horizon.  The CIPDISS analysis 
focused on five critical infrastructure 
areas and their interdependencies: 
roads, electricity supply, 
telecommunications, public health and 
hospitals, and emergency services (EMS 
and police). Since the timeframe for 
reconstruction of New Orleans was 
unknown at the time, the largest 
uncertainty was to what extent and for 
how long displaced persons would 
remain in Baton Rouge. 
The authors produced a third-party 
review of the CIPDSS Baton Rouge 
Report in which its predictions were 
validated against infrastructure 
performance data collected by the 
authors in Baton Rouge.22 The goal of 
the validation process was to determine 
the degree to which the simulation was 
an accurate representation of real world 
conditions in Baton Rouge. Both the 
predictive accuracy of the CIPDSS tool 
and, equally important, the specific 
causes for any deviations from the actual 
course of events were determined.23 
More important than the actual 
validation exercise, however, our 
research produced a body of rich data on 
critical infrastructure performance in 
Baton Rouge, which we turn to next, 
with implications for infrastructure 
resilience.   
Tro: Traffic Tro: Trips 
Completed 
Tro: Exit Rate 
Tro: Entry 
Rate 
Figure 0: Simplified Example of CIPDSS System Dynamics Model for Road Traffic 
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One brief word about resilience. The 
type of infrastructure resilience we treat 
here falls outside of the traditional 
context of physical resilience (e.g., the 
ability to withstand pressure waves 
generated by a detonation); instead we 
investigate resilience in its dimension of 
response to capacity overload or other 
stresses. More specifically, we look at 
the ability of infrastructure to adapt to 
external change created by sudden, 
unanticipated, and often dramatic 
events; in this particular case, an 
increase in demand for the 
infrastructure function.24  
In coming from this perspective, we 
are indebted to several dynamic areas of 
inquiry. This includes recent work that 
has emphasized resilience as a broad but 
practical policy and management goal 
useful for directing government 
priorities and investments, given the 
otherwise impossible task of defending 
against all the man-made or natural 
threats facing critical infrastructure.25 It 
also includes research focused on 
characterizing resilience by defining the 
core or necessary performance traits of a 
resilient community or system: i.e., its 
robustness, the degree in which it 
contains redundancies, the rapidity with 
which it can return to function, and its 
resourcefulness in responding to 
problems; increases in one or more of 
these characteristics of a system results, 
it is hypothesized, in an overall increase 
in resilience.26 But given our focus on 
critical infrastructure and modeling, we 
chose a necessarily multivariate notion 
of resilience, one that is at once 
practical, policy-oriented, interested in 
the observable characteristics that 
indicate resilience in infrastructure 
systems, but also attentive to the 
complexities of interdependent systems. 
  Our approach is equally informed by 
recent work, some of it focused on 
seismic resilience, that has highlighted 
the need to develop integrated measures 
of performance, both technological and 
social, to indicate the level of resilience 
present in a system, often through 
analysis or computer simulation, and so 
enable more effective enhancements of 
resilience.2 And our notion of resilience 
takes seriously a core insight from 
systems engineering – namely, the 
importance of redundancy in achieving 
resilience in crisis situations – yet, we 
have expanded redundancy to include 
the myriad ways in which elements or 
aspects of a given system may 
compensate for setbacks by related 
mitigating factors and interventions.27 
For instance, as we will show below, 
human capital factors – drastically 
increasing professional emergency 
service personnel and staff and their 
hours of work at all levels (i.e., police, 
fire services, ambulance) – helped 
mitigate and blunt any decline in 
emergency services in Baton Rouge in 
the months after Katrina. 
METHODOLOGY:  
CIPDSS Baton Rouge Validation 
Study Data Collection 
As part of the CIPDSS Validation Study, 
we collected descriptive and quantitative 
data in person and in phone interviews 
with infrastructure system 
representatives and stakeholders 
throughout the months of September 
and December 2007. The focus of the 
data collected was on the state of critical 
infrastructure systems in East Baton 
Rouge Parish (EBRP) during the six-
month period post-Hurricane Katrina: 
Sept 2005–Feb 2006. The purpose of 
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these interviews was twofold: to collect 
qualitative inputs on conditions in Baton 
Rouge from persons directly familiar 
with a given critical infrastructure 
sector; and to identify institutional and 
managerial resources for collecting 
quantitative data.  
Participants for interviews were 
selected on the basis of their direct 
expertise and/or experience in oversight 
and management of critical 
infrastructure sectors considered in the 
CIPDSS analysis. Targeted persons 
included representatives from the 
following local, state, federal, private, 
and contractor agencies and 
organizations: LA Department of 
Transportation and Development 
(LADOTD); Baton Rouge Area Chamber 
(of commerce); Alliance Transportation 
Group, Inc (providing travel demand 
modeling services to Baton Rouge); 
Baton Rouge Police Department 
(BRPD); East Baton Rouge Parish 
Sheriff’s Office (EBRPSO), LA State 
Police Troop A, LA State University 
Police Department; Baton Rouge 
Emergency Medical Service (EMS); 
Baton Rouge Fire Department; LA 
Health Association; LA Hospital 
Association; LA Department of Health 
and Human Services (LDHHS); major 
area hospitals including Lane Regional 
Medical Center and Baton Rouge 
General Medical Center; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA); Baton Rouge Emergency 
Operations Center; the LA Governors 
Office of Emergency Management; local 
telecom carriers including AT&T, 
Verizon, and Bell South; and local 
electrical utility Entergy.  
Interviews were semi-structured and 
open-ended, eliciting dialogue and 
feedback in the course of 
conversations.28 Individual interview 
time ran from approximately thirty 
minutes to two hours, depending on 
circumstances and respondents. 
Questions included some of the 
following: “How was your organization 
affected by Katrina?”; “What changes 
were made in the six month period after 
the hurricane?”; “What reports or data 
sets are you aware of describing 
conditions in Baton Rouge during that 
time?” Where possible, publicly 
available information was used to elicit 
more detailed information with 
questions such as: “News reports 
describe these specific conditions, can 
you comment on this and explain how 
your organization responded?” Notes 
were taken manually during the course 
of interviews and were transcribed and 
coded with annotations. When relevant 
quantitative data sets or reports could 
be identified, these were likewise 
retrieved in hard copy or electronic 
formats in follow-up communications.  
Various levels of success were 
achieved in collecting data for each 
sector, largely in accord with the 
challenges others have identified in 
collecting infrastructure performance 
data.29 In general, public services, such 
as emergency services and LADOTD, 
were cooperative in that they were 
willing to share any data they had 
collected and often provided a wealth of 
data. Others, such as hospital systems, 
were cooperative but decentralized, so 
only limited data was available for 
describing the regional hospital system 
as a whole. Telecommunication 
companies were the least cooperative, in 
that they were unable to share any of the 
large quantity of operational data they 
collect. This resulted from strict policies 
discouraging data sharing based on the 
perceived economic risk of releasing 
data that might be valuable to 
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competitors. The local electrical utility 
was very cooperative, perhaps because it 
operates in a less competitive 
environment than telecommunication 
providers. In addition much useful data 
may have been lost because it was 
collected only for immediate operational 
purposes and not archived by the 
organization that collected it. For 
example, a weekly census of patients at 
all Louisiana hospitals was collected by 
LDHHS in the months after Hurricane 
Katrina but these records were not 
retained after use. 
Analysis Schema for CIPDSS 
Baton Rouge Validation Study 
The authors approached the process of 
validating the CIPDSS simulation by 
focusing on ten model variables that 
summarized the simulation results in 
the 2005 CIPDSS Baton Rouge Report 
as well as a number of contributing 
variables and constants. These 
additional variables were chosen by 
their importance in determining the 
values of the output variables and the 
availability of data from Baton Rouge for 
their validation. Although the CIPDSS 
model consists of fourteen sectors and 
over 100 views, the CIPDSS Baton 
Rouge Report only exercised those parts 
of the model most salient to conditions 
in Baton Rouge: five sectors and a dozen 
model views. Thus, many important 
CIPDSS model capabilities, such as 
modeling of disease transmission, 
agricultural systems, or food supplies, 
were not exercised by the Baton Rouge 
scenario and so could not be validated 
by our study.   
The ten output variables, hereafter, 
referred to as “key outputs,” are listed 
below (Table 1) and their significance 
within the model is described. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Key Output Variables for CIPDSS Baton Rouge Simulation 




Ratio of the current time required to complete a trip by road, as 
compared to the time taken at the free flow rate30 
Bed Utilization Fraction of hospital beds currently occupied 
Treated Number of patients being treated within the hospital system at a given time Health Care Hospital Staff 
Available Number of hospital staff present 
EMS Response Number of calls for service which EMS responds to in calls/hour 
EMS Calls The number of calls for service which EMS receives in calls/hour Emergency 
Services Officer Availability 
Ratio 
Ratio of the rate at which calls for police are answered to the rate at 
which they are received 
Power Demand Ratio Ratio of current demand for electricity to the maximum supply rate of the distribution system 
Wire-line Availability Fraction of call attempts which connect successfully on the first try for wire-line calls Telecomm
unications 
Wireless Availability Fraction of call attempts which connect successfully on the first try for wireless calls 
 
Prediction errors for the simulation 
were determined by direct comparison 
of the values for a salient feature 
identified in both key outputs and actual 
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data from Baton Rouge: for example, 
monthly maximum electrical load or 
monthly total number of EMS calls 
serviced. In cases where real-world data 
could not be collected for direct 
comparison with key outputs, important 
model inputs and calculations were 
identified and compared to data from 
Baton Rouge: for example, total number 
of police officers or patients treated. 
With these comparisons as a starting 
point, additional model constants, 
calculations, and interdependencies 
were evaluated by comparison of 
constants to literature values, when 
available, or sensitivity analysis for 
constants for which authoritative values 
did not exist. Source code was evaluated 
by tracing calculations backward from 
key outputs to identify sources of error. 
Finally when calculations were well 
understood and sources of error were 
identified, recommendations for 
improvements were made. 
VALIDATION RESULTS: 
Implications for  
Assessing Resilience 
Data collected in Baton Rouge described 
the behavior of a number of critical 
infrastructures under stress after 
Hurricane Katrina. In addition to 
allowing for a validation of the CIPDSS 
simulation, this data and its analysis 
provided an indication of the degree of 
resilience demonstrated by each 
infrastructure system under moderate 
disruption due to the hurricane and the 
impact of the rapid increase in demand 
for services. Drawing on prior work on 
resilience and our analysis of critical 
infrastructure performance during the 
validation study, we defined several 
factors that help to determine resilience 
of critical infrastructure services in 
Baton Rouge.31 These factors are not 
intended to provide a comprehensive 
theory or complete framework from 
which to define or measure resilience 
enhancing properties.  In fact, quite the 
contrary, they are inductive 
determinations formed from a practice-
based account of specific conditions in 
post-hurricane Baton Rouge that, we 
believe, reveal relevant factors that may 
be generalized and applied to other 
event scenarios and that may help in 
understanding the processes for 
increasing infrastructure resilience 
under a variety of stresses.   
The purpose of this exercise is, thus, 
to contribute to an evolving 
interdisciplinary conversation that is 
shifting discussions of infrastructure 
resilience from a theoretical basis 
toward specific system properties and 
approaches that can be understood and 
usefully manipulated through policy and 
investment. This conversation has, in 
fact, gained additional national traction 
given the September 2010 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 
report, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: DHS Efforts To Assess And 
Promote Resiliency Are Evolving But 
Program Management Could Be 
Strengthened, which “recommends that 
DHS develop resiliency performance 
measures.”32 At the very least these 
factors define questions that may be 
helpful to ask in the process of 
quantitatively assessing and modeling 
critical infrastructure response during 
crises. 
Important factors, identified in the 
Baton Rouge scenario, are described 
below with associated descriptive 
questions. 
Redundancy: Were other equal or 
adequate services available to users? In 
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addition to the commonly considered 
issue of redundant physical system 
components (e.g. lines, switches, roads), 
a less obvious component to redundancy 
is the degree to which alternate services 
can provide similar functionality to end 
users, for example, the substitution of 
back roads or public transportation for 
highways, or wire-less for wire-line 
telecommunication services.  
Responsiveness: Was it possible for new 
or temporary systems and services to be 
made available so that functionality 
could be maintained by users? This 
question encompasses the obvious 
technological and manpower constrains 
but also includes the quality of system 
management. Resilient management 
might be characterized by appropriate 
contingency planning and training at all 
levels of operation and organizational 
capacity for rapid and decentralized 
decision making.   
Elastic capacity or plasticity of 
systems: Were existing systems and 
services elastic or plastic enough to 
extend their capacity under stress 
without major impairment of system 
function? Or was a system enabled to 
“degrade gracefully” so that it would 
function long enough for other systems 
to meet the demand? Could throughput 
of systems be increased without major 
changes, and did these systems utilize 
technologies that were easily expanded 
or which required time and high capital 
investment for expansion?  
Social mitigation: Were existing social 
networks and communities useful in 
providing resources or in creating 
economies of scale that could mitigate 
the demands or stress on a given system 
or service, or in contrast were there 
social factors that hindered adaptation?  
Human capital: Were professional 
persons (law enforcement, EMS, fire 
fighters, medical personnel, etc.) and 
volunteers able to effectively deploy 
themselves or be tasked in emergency 
and mitigation efforts? Was additional 
manpower available from outside the 
system, and was redeployment or 
addition of personnel able to ameliorate 
deficiencies in critical infrastructure 
services?  
In the following sections, the 
performance of each of the 
infrastructure systems considered is 
described, with attention to illustrating 
how these five factors played out in 
Baton Rouge. The results of the 
validation exercise are then 
summarized, and the implications for 
promoting critical infrastructure 
resilience through modeling and 
analysis are discussed.  
Population:  
Primary Infrastructure Stress 
Though the physical damage caused by 
Hurricane Katrina in Baton Rouge was 
limited, the influx of population was a 
significant stress on local 
infrastructure.33 The population in East 
Baton Rouge Parish (EBRP) increased 
over the course of a few days from pre-
Katrina levels of 396,735 to levels of 
around 650,000, according to news 
reports.34 In the weeks following 
Hurricane Katrina, as people returned to 
New Orleans or dispersed to other 
parishes or states, the population began 
to decrease: by the end of the six-month 
period simulated using CIPDSS, the 
population in EBRP had fallen to 
approximately 435,000, according to 
U.S. Census estimates (or 8 percent 
above the pre-Katrina population). 
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Figure 2, below, shows the population 
changes in EBRP over time.  This 
population change drives and frames the 
responses observed within various 
critical infrastructures in Baton Rouge.   
Transit Sector:  
Increased Congestion for Roads 
Many who came to Baton Rouge as a 
result of Hurricane Katrina self-
evacuated via automobile. Baton Rouge 
was also a center of response activities 
for the State of Louisiana with large 
numbers of personnel and supplies 
passing through.35 As a result, soon after 
the hurricane, traffic conditions were 
extremely congested in Baton Rouge, 
and this congestion persisted for some 
time. Figure 3 illustrates these 
conditions through daily traffic counts 
from three locations in EBRP, spanning 
the period pre- and post-Katrina. The 
average daily total traffic volume from 
traffic count sites increased from 8 
percent to 47 percent (18 percent 
average across a total of eight sites) in 
September 2005, as compared to August 
2005. By February 2006 traffic was still 
up by 3 percent to 22 percent (10 percent 
average for all sites). Greater increases in 
traffic counts were observed in the larger 
capacity roads such as I-10 and I-12.  
 Contributing to traffic congestion 
was the fact that prior to Hurricane 
Katrina highways in Louisiana, including 
those in Baton Rouge, were in poor 
condition, and I-10 and arterial streets in 
Baton Rouge were reported to be near 
capacity. As a result, travel times 
increased: rush-hour travel times to 
Ascension parish to the South East of 
Baton Rouge, for instance, were reported 
to have increased by a factor of two.36 
Another contributing factor was the 
limited role that public transportation 
played in Baton Rouge. Community 
Survey Data from the U.S. Census 
indicates that in 2005, 83 percent of the 
184,000 working residents in EBRP 
traveled to work alone by automobile, 
and only 2 percent reported taking 
Figure 0:  Population of East Baton Rouge Parish with Time 
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public transport.37 Due, in part, to a 
FEMA-funded expansion of public 
transportation systems in 2006, there 
were large increases in the number of 
buses in service: from sixty to ninety-
one buses, as part of the Capitol-area 
transit system (CATS) in Baton Rouge.38 
However, there was a much smaller 
increase in trips taken by bus: passenger 
miles increased from 16 to 17 million or 
about 5 percent in 2006. LASwift bus 
service between Baton Rouge and New 
Orleans also began in October 2005, but 
ridership, which grew to 800-900 
passengers per day, was small compared 
to the number of trip taken by 
automobile in Baton Rouge per day. 
 As a result of these converging 
problems – larger number of vehicles, 
roads which were at capacity and poorly 
maintained, and limited availability and 
use of public transportation – relatively 
little could be done to improve traffic 
flow within Baton Rouge in the short 
term. LADOTD commissioned a number 
of special traffic flow studies on arterial 
roads and highways in the weeks after 
Katrina which resulted in some traffic 
light re-timing. However, traffic 
congestion on major highways began to 
improve only as temporary residents 
became more familiar with alternate 
routes.39 Monitoring of traffic flow on I-
10 in Baton Rouge was provided by the 
LADOTD Intelligent Transportation 
System (ITS), which provides 
measurements of traffic speed and 
counts, along with video monitoring. The 
system was disabled immediately after 
Hurricane Katrina, but was rapidly 
brought back online to aid in traffic 
management and was fully operational 
by the second week of September 2005.  
Using ITS data, the increase in travel 
times that resulted from traffic 
congestion was quantified for the five-
mile stretch of I-10 passing through 
downtown Baton Rouge.  LADOTD 
special studies were also used to 
quantify the post-Katrina travel times on 
Figure 0: Daily Total Traffic Counts at Three Sites in EBRP 
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other select roads in Baton Rouge.40 
Traffic speeds at fifteen-minute intervals 
were available for fifty-four individual 
ITS links on I-10, and speed for all links 
were averaged, thereby, providing a 
single value for each fifteen-minute 
interval. The relative trip duration was 
calculated by taking the ratio of 
observed ITS speed to a free flow rate, 
assumed equivalent to the 65 mph speed 
limit. For LADOTD special studies, 
travel times were recorded by test cars 
driving a number of routes during AM 
and PM peak travel times. In these cases 
traffic speeds were calculated from 
travel times and route distance, and the 
ratio of actual speed to the posted speed 
limit was taken as the Trip Duration 
Multiplier. 
A summary of the Trip Duration 
Multiplier from ITS and special studies 
are shown in Figure 4. ITS data 
represents quarter-hourly averages from 
two-week periods prior to, immediately 
after, and six months after Hurricane 
Katrina (April 2005, September 2005, 
and February 2006). Values for special 
studies are averages of ten pairs of 
morning and evening measurements. 
Travel times on I-10 more than doubled 
in early September 2005, compared to 
pre-Katrina levels, and the high 
congestion “rush hour” period was 
observed to have increased significantly 
in length. By February 2006 travel times 
and “rush hour” length had dropped 
significantly, but not quite back to 
original levels. Travel times on smaller 
highways and arterial streets were 
greater than on I-10, but this was also 
likely the case prior to Hurricane 
Katrina. 
Summary travel data, including 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT), vehicle 
hours of travel (VHT), and vehicle hours 
of delay were also obtained from the 
Capital Regional Planning Commission 
Travel Demand Model (CRPCTDM). 
Data consisted of a summary of weekday 
daily travel from the model under 
population conditions for the years 
2004 and a projected 2009 population 
13 percent larger than the 2004 
population. This population level was 
reached for a brief period in December 
2005, so 2009 travel parameters from 
the CRPCTDM may approximate the 
situation in EBRP at that time. 
Approximately 3.3 trips per person per 
day are assumed in both years. The 
Figure 0: Trip Multiplier with Time of Day 
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model shows a 27 percent increase in 
hours of delay (VHD) in 2009, 
compared to 2004.  
Overall, increased traffic volume 
observed in Baton Rouge rose directly in 
parallel to the increased population, 
and, as no effective means was available 
to deal with increased demand, the 
quality of service provided by the road 
infrastructure decreased as population 
increased. This finding demonstrates 
both a relative lack of redundancy 
within the system – no alternative 
routes or transport mechanisms were 
easily available – and an inability for 
services to respond rapidly to such 
changing circumstances, mainly because 
of physical limitations of existing 
systems.  
It also raises another issue. Road 
systems are particularly inelastic: 
expanding their capacity requires not 
only capital investment, planning, but 
also building and construction projects 
of a scale and time frame incompatible 
with a disaster setting. But there is a 
subtler social component to the problem 
as well. Even when bus systems were 
expanded through outside funding, and 
despite continuing traffic congestion, 
bus ridership only increased slightly. 
This suggests that lack of social 
acceptance of public transportation 
alternatives may have also been a 
limiting factor. It is interesting to 
speculate if the situation might have 
been more effectively mitigated by 
interventions into social factors which 
encouraged (through advertising 
campaigns or community efforts) 
greater use of car-pooling or other forms 
of collective transportation to bypass the 
physical limitations of the 
transportation system. It is this mode of 
questioning and style of reasoning in 
approaching resilience infrastructure 
that what we hope to convey in this 
article. 
Power Sector:  
Adequate Electricity Capacity 
One local utility, Entergy, provides 90 
percent of the service in EBRP. 
Approximately 40-60 percent of 
electrical demand is residential use, 20-
30 percent is commercial demand, and 
10-40 percent is industrial demand. The 
electrical power grid in Baton Rouge 
received only moderate damage during 
Hurricane Katrina. Although over 40 
percent of customers were without 
service immediately after the storm, 
service was almost entirely restored 
within one week, as illustrated in Figure 
5.  
Entergy provided information on the 
maximum hourly electrical usage in a 
given month (monthly maximum load) 
before and after Hurricane Katrina. In 
general, monthly maximum load was 
strongly seasonal, with high demand 
occurring in summer months due to air 
conditioning use. As a result, a strong 
correlation is observed between 
maximum load and maximum air 
temperature (See Figure 6). Maximum 
loads in 2005 were similar to those in 
prior and subsequent years, with the 
exception of unusually high electricity 
demand in September of 2005. 
Maximum air temperatures in 
September and August of 2005 were the 
same (98 degrees), but maximum 
demand in September was 110 MW (or 
11 percent) higher than in August. This 
additional demand is hypothesized to be 
the result of the increased population in 
EBRP. 
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Using a series of assumptions it is 
possible to estimate the electrical usage 
of temporary residents in Baton Rouge. 
Population during September 2005 was 
elevated by between 250,000 and 
70,000 persons. As the exact population 
at the time of peak demand was not 
known, a mid-range value of 200,000 
additional persons was assumed.  
Demand from commercial and 
industrial sources, typically about half of 
the total, was assumed to have remained 
constant between August and 
September. Under these assumptions 
temporary residents in September used 
approximately 50 percent of the energy 
per capita of a permanent resident. This 
finding is explained by the fact that 
temporary residents largely stayed with 
friends, relatives, or volunteers in 
private homes or publicly or privately 
organized shelters, thus leading to 
greater efficiency in electricity usage.  
Our general findings with respect to 
post-Katrina energy usage, then, were 
twofold: first, the reconnection of 
established customers was accomplished 
rapidly; and second, the electrical 
system had adequate capacity to meet 
the relatively small increase in demand, 
caused be the increased population. In 
short, the electrical supply system 
proved to be fairly resilient under these 
specific stresses. The social dimension to 
this systemic resilience should not be 
neglected. The scale of the evacuation 
after Katrina forced a blurring between 
what would typically be considered 
emergency or temporary shelter and 
longer-term temporary housing.41 As a 
result, hurricane evacuees in Baton 
Rouge made do for an extended period 
in established residences and various 
public and private shelters. This social 
response to limited housing stock helped 
to mitigate what could have been be an 
additional stress on the electricity 
system and services. 
Figure 0: Number of Customers without Electrical Power in EVRP 
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Telecommunications Sector: 
Rapid Recovery  
of Telephone Service 
Although less severe than in areas closer 
to the coast, power loss and wind 
damage initially disrupted both wire and 
wireless services within EBRP. 
Quantitative data for describing the 
state of telecommunication in Baton 
Rouge after Hurricane Katrina, however, 
could not be obtained; such information 
(e.g. call volumes, fraction of calls lost) 
was perceived to be privileged 
commercial information and, thus, a 
matter of competitive advantage 
amongst carriers.   
One wireless carrier, however, did 
report that intense overloads occurred 
only in the first few days after Hurricane 
Katrina and the network was fully 
meeting demands within one month 
post-event. Moreover, the same provider 
cited a need for additional cell sites in 
Baton Rouge over the course of the 
following year in order to improve 
coverage and quality of service in 
response to the changing spatial 
distributions of population. Similar 
increases and growth in coverage was 
also required in EBRP by Bell South, a 
major regional wire line provider, to 
meet increased demand post-Katrina.42 
Wireless carriers may have been able 
to recover more quickly than wire 
carriers through their use of portable 
cellular base stations, several of which 
were deployed in EBRP. Qualitative 
information from a number of sources 
suggested that displaced people relied 
heavily on cellular services, and 
increases in cellular usage have been 
reported in Katrina-impacted areas, 
including Baton Rouge. In addition, 
some wireless carriers provided special 
outreach services to displaced people 
and to some households (for example, 
free phones and service).43 
Overall the telecommunication sector 
in Baton Rouge proved relatively 
resilient, largely, because of its ability to 
rapidly repair and/or deploy auxiliary 
equipment. Comparing the response of 
transportation with telecom systems 
illustrates the importance of flexibility in 
infrastructure systems, as well as how 
that flexibility may correlate with the 
actual technologies used in each system. 
The ability to quickly extend or expand 
Figure 0: Maximum Electrical Load and Air Temperature in EBRP 
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capacities had a significant impact on 
system resilience.    
Emergency Services: Adjustments 
by Law Enforcement, Ems, Fire 
Service to Meet Increased Demand 
Immediately after Hurricane Katrina, 
demand for emergency services 
increased dramatically, due to both the 
increase in population and disruptions 
associated with the hurricane. The 
Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) 
handles calls to police within the city of 
Baton Rouge: these numbered 15,000-
25,000 per month in the period post-
Hurricane Katrina. The East Baton 
Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office (EBRPSO) 
handled calls for police within the EBRP 
but outside the city limits; these 
numbered 2,000-3,000 per month in 
the post-Hurricane Katrina period. State 
police respond primarily to incidents on 
state highways, which numbered 
approximately 300-400 per month in 
the same period. 
Detailed information about each call 
serviced during our study’s period was 
obtained from the BRPD Computer 
Assisted Dispatch (CAD) system, while 
the EBRPSO and state police provides 
only monthly total call volumes. Not 
considered in this analysis were the 
thousands of calls for assistance 
originating in New Orleans, which were 
then routed to state police in Baton 
Rouge, as well as to other law-
enforcement jurisdictions, in the 
immediate aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina.44  
The daily volume of BRPD calls 
before, during, and after Hurricane 
Katrina are illustrated in Figure 7 and 
divided into four classes of law 
enforcement issues: criminal, alarms, 
traffic related, and other. In general, the 
highest traffic-call volumes occurred on 
Fridays, whereas the lowest call volumes 
Figure 0: Daily Baton Rouge Police Call Rates 
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occurred on Sundays with a similar, if 
less dramatic, pattern also visible for 
criminal calls. Hurricane Katrina is 
identified in the time series by a sudden 
spike in alarm calls that resulted from 
alarm systems being disrupted by the 
storm. This spike was followed by an 
increase over the next two days of both 
criminal and traffic related police calls.  
Figure 7 also shows a similar, but 
smaller, effect on alarm and criminal 
call volumes (but not traffic calls) 
observed in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Rita on September 25, 2005.  
Monthly totals of calls serviced by the 
sheriff’s office increased in a similar 
fashion to EBRPD calls. Calls to state 
police in September 2005 also 
increased, but the number of calls, 
particularly for incidents on I-10 and 
U.S. 61 (a major road running north-
south through Baton Rouge), continued 
to increase in October and November 
2005 not dropping back to near baseline 
levels until February of 2006. 
The demand for EMS and fire service 
also increased. Figure 8 illustrates 
monthly total calls for all three 
emergency services in the city of Baton 
Rouge. In September 2005, BRPD calls 
increased 24 percent, EMS Calls 
increased 49 percent, and fire calls 
increased 39 percent, while population 
was up by about 40 percent (on average) 
during the same month. Complicating 
this picture, a majority of calls directed 
to the fire department, both before and 
after Katrina, were for EMS assistance. 
Non-emergency ambulance service 
provided by private companies 
experienced an increase in demand 
within Baton Rouge, as well as being 
contracted by FEMA for evacuation 
response in New Orleans. By the 
beginning of 2006, demand for all 
emergency services had dropped to 
about 6 percent above pre-Katrina 
levels, in proportion to the remaindering 
evacuee population.  
Meeting this increase in demand for 
emergency services required a massive 
redeployment of personnel. During the 
first week after Hurricane Katrina, all 
600 BRPD officers operated under an 
emergency schedule with staff officers 
reassigned to patrol duty, twelve-hour 
Figure 0: Monthly Emergency Service Calls in the City of Baton Rouge 
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shifts, seven days a week, and 
cancellation of scheduled leave. These 
twelve-hour shifts continued for 
approximately two months. Similarly, 
sheriff’s officers were redeployed so that 
there were approximately 200 officers 
assigned to patrol duty in the weeks 
following Katrina, as compared to 130 
officers pre-Katrina. No information 
could be obtained on state police staff 
levels. 
The number of BRPD officers on duty 
at any given time was calculated based 
on the number of individual officers 
responding to calls each day, according 
to CAD records during the periods when 
eight- and twelve-hour shifts were in 
effect (Figure 9). Immediately after 
Hurricane Katrina, the number of 
responding officers almost doubled, but 
during the subsequent two month 
period of twelve-hour shifts, the number 
of officers on duty returned to this peak 
value only on Fridays, the day of the 
week with peak demand. Even during 
full emergency deployment, it was only 
possible to field one-quarter to one-third 
of the total number of BRPD officers at 
any given time. These numbers reflect 
the fact that officers were needed to staff 
police stations and perform other duties 
in addition to respond to calls. As shift 
schedule was not known, the number of 
sheriff's officers on patrol prior to and 
post-Katrina were estimated from the 
reported number of officers on duty, 
with error bars representing high and 
low estimates corresponding to eight- 
and twelve-hour shift lengths (Figure 9).  
Although their total number was not 
determined, law enforcement personnel 
from other jurisdictions, university 
police, and National Guard troops 
provided additional security services in 
Baton Rouge. For example Louisiana 
State University Police (LSUP) assisted 
in the security effort at the field hospital 
set up at the LSU Pete Maravich 
Assembly Center (PMAC), as well as 
responded to calls on campus. Over 200 
National Guard also accompanied police 
on routine patrols and assisted with aid 
distribution in the hurricane’s first 
weeks.45  
The EMS and fire department in 
Baton Rouge also needed to adjust 
staffing to meet the increased demand 
for services. At the time of Hurricane 
Katrina, EMS personnel totaled about 
117. Hurricane Katrina saw the initiation 
Figure 0: Law Enforcement Officers on Duty 
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of twelve-hour shifts (with no time off), 
and qualified office staff was redeployed 
to answer calls. Ambulances were also in 
limited supply, with the entire available 
fleet, approximately thirty vehicles, 
brought immediately into service.  Fire 
department staff were also redeployed: 
BRFD had a total staff of 575 fire 
fighters prior to Hurricane Katrina and a 
minimum of 107 fire fighters were on 
shift at any time; immediately after the 
event, that number increased to a range 
from 175 to 180 on shift.  
Shortages of staff and conditions such 
as loss of power, telephone service, and 
road congestion may have decreased the 
ability of emergency services to receive 
and process requests for aid. Although 
such effects may be difficult to measure 
individually, performance data can 
indicate if emergency services had 
become less effective.  
A common measure of emergency 
service performance is response time. 
Daily averages of response times for 
EBRP calls are shown in Figure 10. 
Response times for high priority calls 
(Code 3), which make up 3 percent of 
the total, and Code 2 calls, which make 
up 30 percent of the total, stayed 
reasonably steady after Hurricane 
Katrina – although occasional high-daily 
averages may have become more 
frequent. Response time of low priority 
calls (Code 1), which are 67 percent of 
the total, gradually increased by two to 
three minutes (10-14 percent) in the 
months after Hurricane Katrina. This 
increase was due to longer hold times 
(time from operators receiving a call, 
until an officer is dispatched), while the 
travel time (from dispatch to arrival on 
the scene) stayed fairly constant.  
This finding suggests that, although a 
backlog of low-priority calls developed 
during periods of high demand, the 
ability of EBRPD to respond to calls was 
not noticeably compromised by the 
conditions in Baton Rouge. Similarly, in 
September of 2005, total EMS call time 
actually went down to a low of thirty-
four minutes (as compared to a usual 
range prior to Hurricane Katrina of 
thirty-six to forty minutes) – 
presumably as a result of a larger 
number of staff and ambulances in 
service. Overall, emergency services 
personnel were able to redistribute 
personnel and resources, prioritize 
response to more serious incidents, and 
compensate for conditions that might 
have impacted their effectiveness (such 
as traffic congestion) so that the quality 
of service remained fairly constant after 
Katrina – even as the burden of 
response increased markedly. 
In this respect, emergency service 
systems at all levels – police, fire 
services, and ambulance – showed a 
remarkable ability to cope with and 
adapt to the changing situation in EBRP. 
There is little doubt that, in these 
systems, human capital was a main 
source for resilience; this included the 
ability of leadership to make timely 
decisions in increasing personnel and 
redeploying office personnel to field 
duty and the personal flexibility 
demonstrated by security and 
emergency response professionals.  
Public Health Sector: Supplements 
to Overwhelmed Hospital System 
The hospital system in Baton Rouge was 
particularly strained after Hurricane 
Katrina. In addition to an increase in 
population and the resulting increase in 
those in need of medical services, many 
evacuees from New Orleans had greater-
than-average medical needs.  
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To meet this demand there were 
approximately 1,770 hospital beds in five 
acute care hospitals within EBRP. 
Several smaller hospitals in the parish 
brought this count of staffed hospital 
beds up to approximately 2,000. Before 
Hurricane Katrina, hospital occupancy 
in Baton Rouge was close to the 
Louisiana average of 60 percent, 
providing approximately 800 free 
beds.46 An additional 800 beds for 
evacuees were provided for a two-week 
period at the LSU PMAC. In the first two 
months after Katrina, reports to the 
parish Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) indicate that occupancy at EBRP 
hospitals was up to 96 percent.47 By 
February 2006 the occupancy of acute 
care hospitals was down to 63 percent, 
according to the Louisiana Hospital 
Association, only slightly above the pre-
Katrina rates.  
During the first week after Katrina, 
5,700 patients were treated at the PMAC 
field hospital, and 2,500 evacuees were 
treated by one acute care hospital with 
about 430 beds. Estimates of the total 
number of displaced people treated in 
EBRP hospitals were not available, but 
the value of 2,500 treated in one 
hospital, when scaled proportionately to 
the total number of hospital beds in 
EBRP, gives a value of approximately 
12,500 persons – who may have been 
treated at hospitals during the first week 
after Katrina. This number gives a total 
of approximately 18,000 displaced 
people treated within the parish in that 
period.  
Although a large number, this 18,000 
represents less than 10 percent of the 
total population of evacuees. For 
comparison, approximately 30 percent 
of a population of 3,700 evacuated 
(some from the New Orleans 
superdome) after Katrina to Fort Worth, 
TX required medical care within the first 
week, though only 1 percent required 
inpatient care; similarly a sampling of 
those evacuated to Louisiana shelters 
indicates that over 34 percent required 
immediate medical care.48  
Once the acute medical needs of 
evacuees had been addressed and the 
population began to disperse, demand 
for medical services decreased in 
Figure 0: BRPD Response Time Averaged by Day 
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proportion to population. For instance 
one hospital reported a 9 percent 
increase in emergency room visits as of 
February 2006, when the population 
was also about 9 percent elevated. 
In extreme cases, a crude measure of 
medical care quality is the level of 
mortality in the population served. 
Limited information was available on 
mortality in post-Katrina Baton Rouge. 
The number of monthly deaths observed 
within EBRP was reported as part of a 
special study released by the Louisiana 
division of health and hospitals.49 The 
report presents deaths tabulated by the 
parish of permanent residence, so values 
for EBRP may not, particularly in the 
first months after Katrina, reflect 
mortality among evacuee populations 
residing temporarily in EBRP. However, 
the reported mortality rate in EBRP 
remained close to constant pre- and 
post-Hurricane Katrina. This result 
suggests that supplementary aid in the 
form of field hospitals, as well as the 
efforts of hospitals to increase the 
quantity of care provided, were 
sufficient to prevent any serious changes 
in the quality of medical services 
available to the local population post-
Katrina. 
SOME CHALLENGES FOR 
ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE 
Investigation of the performance of 
critical infrastructure systems in Baton 
Rouge after Hurricane Katrina provides 
insights into the nature of resilient 
infrastructure, the challenges faced in 
applying simulation to promoting 
resilience, and the need for adequate 
infrastructure performance data in any 
such attempt.  In this last section, we 
discuss the CIPDSS validation results in 
terms of promoting critical resilience 
infrastructure, the applicable policy 
lessons learned from this process, and 
questions for further research.   
Identification of Systems-Level 
Needs from CIPDSS Validation 
As previously observed, the movement 
of evacuees out of Baton Rouge was not 
known when the CIPDSS simulation was 
performed, thereby, creating a high 
degree of uncertainty about the levels of 
stress placed on critical infrastructures 
over time. In addition, the CIPDSS 
model methodology was not, at the time, 
designed for scenarios involving 
dynamic population within a single 
model run. The Baton Rouge simulation, 
instead, assumed that peak population, 
taken as 1.5 times the original 
population, remained in Baton Rouge 
permanently. Such static assumptions 
have the value of providing an estimate 
of the maximum impact possible in 
Baton Rouge, although the now-known 
decrease in population over time makes 
it clear that this is an overestimate of 
actual effects. Given past experiences 
with significant population 
displacements in the U.S. (e.g. 
Hurricane Andrew) and their likelihood 
in the future, the ability to simulate 
population movement and resulting 
impacts across all infrastructures may 
be critical in understanding regional 
resilience. While the basic ability to 
simulate effects of changing population 
has reportedly been enhanced in model 
updates, much remains unexplored 
about the behavior driving population 
movement. Indeed the ability to 
understand and model this and other 
behavioral and social factors (for 
example, institutional trust) is a major 
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area for improvement in the analysis of 
infrastructure resilience.  
 The CIPDSS simulation of the Baton 
Rouge road system highlighted the need 
for appropriate model inputs for the 
characterization of infrastructure 
performance. The quality of road 
function in the simulation was described 
by the value of the Trip Duration 
Multiplier. Comparison of the Trip 
Duration Multiplier observed in Baton 
Rouge to CIPDSS predictions indicated 
that evening rush hour travel times were 
reasonably predicted, but trip duration 
was severely overestimated during 
morning rush hour periods. This 
overestimation resulted, in large part, 
from default input parameters that 
prescribed a higher number of trips 
initiated during the morning compared 
to evening rush hours, opposite to what 
was observed in Baton Rouge. In 
addition, comparison with the Baton 
Rouge Travel Demand Model indicates 
that the total number of trips in each 
day was overestimated. Such 
shortcomings could be easily remedied 
given sufficient data at the time of 
analysis, but as many of these 
parameters are unique to individual 
metropolitan areas, collecting data in 
the timeframe required for a rapid 
simulation is challenging. 
The CIPDSS simulation of electrical 
power usage in Baton Rouge neglected 
to take into account seasonality in 
electricity demand, which in Baton 
Rouge is a significant issue. The model 
input also prescribed a gradual 20 
percent increase in load over six 
months, whereas in reality an 11 percent 
increase occurred in the first month and 
disappeared as population dispersed. In 
addition, the dependence of the 
electrical supply system on the 
availability of fuels (coal, oil, and gas) 
and on transportation systems for their 
delivery was not reflected in the CIPDSS 
model at the time. Although loss of fuel 
supply did not impact electricity 
generation in Baton Rouge, the 
importance of this dependency is 
highlighted by the disruptions and price 
increases resulting from the breakdown 
in transportation of fuels after 
Hurricane Katrina. These shortfalls in 
the simulation process all highlight one 
of the fundamental difficulties of both 
broad efforts at infrastructure modeling 
in general and analysis of resilience in 
specific: defining the boundaries of the 
systems considered. The analysis must 
be limited to a scope which is feasible 
with available resources but also must 
include all major interactions, which will 
vary with the scenario considered and 
may include aspects of both the natural 
environment and other infrastructure 
systems. 
Telecommunications is one of the 
more complex views in the CIPDSS 
model but because of the scarcity of data 
for comparison many of the abilities and 
computational methods of this sector 
could not be validated. Much of the 
telecom simulation was dependent on 
constant values that dictated the length 
and severity of phone service overload.  
A ninety-day period was prescribed in 
CIPDSS for Wire-line and Wireless 
Availability to return to pre Katrina 
levels. Limited data from Baton Rouge 
indicates that phone service returned to 
pre-Katrina levels more quickly than 
expected. In this case limited 
information, due in large part to the 
private ownership of this critical 
infrastructure, prevented a meaningful 
analysis of infrastructure performance.  
This is not an incidental problem in 
critical infrastructure modeling for 
resilience. 
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In contrast, the models of the 
emergency services sectors in CIPDSS 
were relatively simple, and much data 
was available for validation, particularly 
from law enforcement. Officer 
Availability Ratio could not be directly 
validated. Instead an input to that 
variable, the Law Enforcement Service 
Rate, was evaluated. CIPDSS 
significantly underestimated the rate at 
which police calls were answered in 
Baton Rouge.  The model also 
underestimated EMS Response during 
the first five weeks of the scenario.  In 
both cases, underestimation was largely 
due to calculations that too heavily 
weighted the influence of telephone 
service and traffic congestion on the 
ability of emergency services to receive 
and respond to calls. This reflects the 
noted underestimation of the level of 
service within the road and telecom 
systems describing the impact of these 
conditions on emergency service 
effectiveness, which may have been too 
pessimistic. But it also reflects an 
analytical gap: the difficulty in 
imagining and, thus, accounting for 
responsiveness in a system, as well as 
social mitigation and human capital 
interventions at various levels.  That is, 
in addition to shortcomings in the 
calculation of emergency service rates 
(which was known to CIPDSS 
developers but not able yet to be 
remedied at the time of analysis), the 
model did not allow for the possibility of 
extra personnel to compensate for lost 
effectiveness due to traffic, telecom, or 
other conditions. As a result CIPDISS 
predicted long wait times and 
unanswered calls for all emergency 
services, which were not observed in 
Baton Rouge. This suggests that a more 
sophisticated emergency services model 
might be required which takes into 
consideration the factors (among others) 
that we have outlined here. But it also 
demonstrates the extreme difficulty of 
predicting results from even relatively 
simple interactions between 
infrastructure sectors (e.g. delays to 
police response due to traffic, loss of 
EMS calls due to limited telephone 
service) in the absence of empirical data 
and the virtues of marrying empirical 
with qualitative analysis, as Sandia 
National Laboratories’ Energy and 
Systems Analysis Infrastructure, A 
Framework for Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience Analysis has suggested.50 
Hospital occupancy rate or Bed 
Utilization was underestimated at the 
initiation of the CIPDSS simulation, due 
to the assumption of 85 percent 
occupancy (more typical of a city larger 
than Baton Rouge), but it was correctly 
predicted that hospitals would reach and 
stay at maximum occupancy for several 
months. However, because the model 
did not include patients representing 
sick or injured evacuees, the number of 
those Treated in the hospital system 
within the first week was 
underestimated by as much as a factor 
of 8.  This represents a failure to 
consider that evacuees were potentially 
at greater risk of illness, injury, and 
infectious disease through demographic 
factors (e.g. the elderly) as well as 
exposure to flood water and the stress of 
evacuating. Subsequently, Treated was 
overestimated as actual population 
decreased sharply in Baton Rouge, but 
not in the simulation. The model did 
correctly predict the need for an 
increase in bed capacity of 
approximately 1,000 beds, but did not 
differentiate between the rapid 
deployment of emergency medical 
facilities and the permanent expansion 
of the hospital system.  Additionally, 
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mortality rates calculated by CIPDSS are 
higher than those observed in Baton 
Rouge, due to the projected effects of 
longer wait times for ER treatment and 
lower staff to patient ratios. ER 
treatment rates within CIPDSS is 
estimated based on a measure of 
effectiveness in a similar fashion as for 
emergency services, and likewise 
effectiveness appears to have been 
underestimated resulting in an 
overestimate of mortality. At issue here 
again are two challenges already 
identified: the need to integrate human 
and social factors with analysis of the 
infrastructure system and the difficulty 
of estimating the magnitude of 
interactions between infrastructure 
components which may not have been 
previously observed or quantified.   
Challenges in Simulation  
Modeling from CIPDSS Validation 
Despite the extreme stress experienced 
by infrastructures due to the sudden 
increase in population in Baton Rouge, 
no serious loss of services occurred. This 
result was the product of two factors: the 
limited direct impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina on Baton Rouge and, conversely, 
the unanticipated and reasonable level 
of resilience demonstrated by its 
infrastructure through a variety of 
adaptive processes.  
Given adequate resources and 
manpower, the hospital and emergency 
service systems were able to respond 
readily, provided that they were 
supplemented by temporary aids and 
expedients (such as the PEMAC field 
hospital) and longer shifts for 
emergency service workers, enabling 
them to meet a surge in demand beyond 
their usual capacity. Similarly, wireless 
telephone service providers were also 
responsive, able to deploy portable 
wireless equipment to meet increased 
demand, which resulted in relatively 
short service interruptions given the 
magnitude of the changes in system 
load. In fact, this rapid response 
appeared to accelerate preexisting 
trends towards increased use of wireless 
service.  
The power grid, often considered a 
tightly coupled and relatively brittle 
infrastructure system, exhibited excess 
capacity in Baton Rouge to meet the 
unusual but relatively small increase in 
demand from higher populations. The 
stress on the road system proved to be 
the least manageable challenge, given a 
fixed supply of service available, a 
system close to capacity prior to Katrina, 
and a limited infrastructure and social 
acceptance of mass transit alternatives. 
As a result, despite the best efforts of 
infrastructure managers, there was little 
to be done to address increased 
congestion and longer travel times post-
Katrina, conditions which only abated as 
extra population dispersed. Even though 
many infrastructure sectors were 
successful in managing the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in Baton Rouge, 
almost all described challenges and 
lessons learned, and, under more 
extreme or different stresses, more 
damaging outcomes were certainly 
possible. Conversely, efforts to increase 
resilience might expand upon and 
enhance existing coping ability and 
focus on enabling systems to function 
acceptably under a broad range of 
conditions.  
Although tools like CIPDSS can in 
principle contribute to a more orderly 
and efficient deployment of services and 
provide insight into effective adaptation 
strategies to increase resilience, 
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validation of the model against 
observations in Baton Rouge reveals 
some challenges facing such efforts. 
These challenges are particularly 
daunting when trying to develop 
modeling systems that can provide a 
broad view for the management of many 
interdependent infrastructure systems. 
The most immediate challenge is 
choosing the appropriate goals and 
methodology for a modeling tool – a 
problem evident in the fact that the 
degree of complexity of model sectors 
within CIPDSS varies widely, is 
influenced by the priorities of the model 
developers, and is not always in accord 
with the importance of the sector during 
a given simulation. For example, the 
electricity subsector in CIPDSS is fairly 
simple with a limited number of 
interdependencies, but interdependence 
with this sector is of critical importance, 
as demonstrated by the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on energy supply 
chains.51 
Approximately half of the instances of 
prediction error observed within the 
simulation of Baton Rouge were due to a 
less than ideal choice of model input, 
with the rest explained by omissions or 
limitations in assumptions and 
calculation methods. The significant 
amount of error caused by model inputs 
highlights the fact that large amounts of 
scenario or location-specific information 
is required to deploy CIPDSS or any 
model of infrastructure resilience with 
accuracy. This is particularly a challenge 
for rapid deployment of modeling tools. 
To address this, data on metropolitan 
regions of interest can be pre-compiled 
or more model behaviors can be 
parameterized, although both measures 
involve a trade-off with the specificity of 
the model scenario. One potential 
approach to addressing this need for 
reliable and validated inputs for various 
infrastructure sectors might be to obtain 
information from the wealth of existing 
location-specific infrastructure models, 
for example the Baton Rouge travel 
demand model. 
A shortfall observed throughout the 
CIPDSS sectors involved in the Baton 
Rouge simulation was particularly 
noticeable in the telephone subsector. 
Many of the computations of the 
telecom model had little impact on end 
results because scenario-specific 
constant values largely determined the 
model’s behavior. These inputs were 
used to produce reasonable results 
during the process of rapid deployment 
in large part because the model was not 
originally designed with population 
fluctuation in mind as a driving force for 
a scenario. Use of population as a 
driving force would, however, require 
the ability to predict the population 
dynamics of a given scenario from 
limited data, and such modeling of 
human behavior possesses its own basic 
and technical challenges. This reliance 
on choice of constants to produce 
reasonable results also reflects the 
extreme difficulty of predicting the 
needs of users of a simulation model 
intended to be applied to a variety of 
very different scenarios.  
Another difficulty was the estimation 
of interdependencies where, in many 
cases, the strength of the interactions 
being modeled where overestimated. 
This demonstrated a particular need for 
calibration and validation of the 
functions and calculations that describe 
interdependencies in CIPDSS. A 
shortfall exists in basic knowledge about 
the behavior of interacting 
infrastructures that can only be 
overcome through the collection of 
sufficient performance data from a 
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variety of stressful and crisis conditions 
across a representative selection of 
metropolitan areas.   
Lastly, maintaining consistency of 
assumptions between model sectors, 
often programmed and set up for 
analysis by different operators, can also 
be a challenge. For example, the Baton 
Rouge simulation assumed that growth 
takes place in road capacity over a six-
month period, but the number of police 
officers over the same period is static.  
These and other challenges in 
promoting resilience through 
simulation-based analysis are 
summarized in Table 2. Both technical 
and conceptual difficulties are presented 
along with new directions in which 
solutions may be found in the arenas of 
research, implementation, and policy. It 
is important to recall that the Baton 
Rouge scenario did not exercise many 
important capabilities of the CIPDSS 
model and, thus, that all model 
components may display a similar mix 
of soft spots and promising successes, as 
those examined in this study. Hence, 
comparison of modeling efforts with real 
world data is a necessary step in 
bringing CIPDSS or any similar model to 
maturity, but must also be an ongoing 
process. Improvements to the model 
identified by this analysis have largely 
been implemented in subsequent 
revisions. However, shortfalls are still 
expected in applying the updated model 
to new scenarios. Development of 
comprehensive and multi-component 
modeling systems in a fashion so as to 
provide accurate predictions to guide 
resilience planning is inevitably a 
continuous process of refinement.  
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Table 2: Summary of Challenges in Use of Modeling to Promote Resilience 
ISSUE POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
Research  
Goals and methodology of modeling tools vary 
with scenario and concerns of the user.  
Broad interdisciplinary input needed from all infrastructure 
sectors and stakeholders to define analysis needs and 
develop capabilities. 
Population dynamics and other social factors are 
important to critical infrastructure resilience; 
tools for understanding such issues may not 
exist. 
R&D is needed to produce social and behavioral models 
addressing infrastructure resilience and to integrate them 
with engineering models. 
Resilience of critical infrastructures varies widely 
depending on factors such as ability to bring in 
supplemental resources and excess capacity. 
Measures of infrastructure resilience must take into account 
the mechanisms by which systems attempt to maintain 
output and the circumstances under which coping is not 
possible. 
The nature and magnitude of interdependence 
between critical infrastructures is largely 
unknown. 
Empirical data on infrastructure interdependency is needed 
across many infrastructures and stressors. As threats may 
be rare or unprecedented, in some cases broad input from 
experts is the only means to understand interdependencies.  
Implementation  
Difficult to maintain consistency of assumptions 
across large and complex models. 
Modeling and analysis efforts must be well coordinated to 
keep consistency across model components.  
Large quantities of geographic or situation-
specific information are necessary for 
simulations, this is particularity challenging for 
rapid analysis.  
Data may be pre-compiled or harvested from existing 
infrastructure models. Attention must be given to 
geographic variation in infrastructure characteristics.  
 Importance of a given interdependency varies 
with   scenario. 
Must account for all major interdependencies, considering 
perspective of all stakeholders, including interactions with 
the natural environment.  
Policy  
Infrastructure performance data may not be 
available because it is not collected or it is 
proprietary. 
Protocols for routine collection of data and additional 
mechanisms for access to proprietary data are needed. 
Alternatively, incentives should encourage private 
infrastructures to analyze and report on their proprietary 
data from a resilience perspective.  
Extensive prior planning and coordination is 
needed for resilience; particularly when a crisis 
cuts across multiple infrastructures and 
stakeholders. 
 Community-based assessments of resilience should be 
promoted, possibly with additional funding to address 
identified challenges52  
Sophisticated analysis is needed for development 
of local, as well as national, policies and plans. 
However, sophisticated analysis tools (i.e., 
CIPDSS) and experts required for their use have 
limited availability.    
A route for analytical support must be developed so that 
critical infrastructure modeling expertise is available at a 
local level. One possible route: building on pre- existing 
relationships of local infrastructure representatives and 
emergency response and planning authorities through 
regional intelligence fusion centers.  
Inelastic systems, which are least resilient, must 
have greater redundancy and more advanced 
planning and management to optimize use of 
existing resources.  
Otherwise unneeded redundancy may justify public support 
(e.g. tax incentives) if it increases resilience. Everyday 
services that provide redundancy in a crisis should be 
encouraged (e.g. public transportation, pedestrian 
walkways). Sophisticated tools should be utilized to manage 
systems with limited capacity, (e.g. enhanced ITS systems to 
provide alternative routing. 
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CONCLUSION:  
Future Directions in Resilience 
Modeling and Data Collection 
Resilience is a fundamental goal for 
critical infrastructure systems. Fostering 
resilience is by necessity an 
interdisciplinary effort involving 
expertise from subject-matter experts 
across infrastructure sectors, as well as 
knowledge from far outside these fields. 
While the resilience of individual 
infrastructures is a focus of significant 
attention by system managers, a 
resilient interdependent “system of 
systems” which comprises modern 
societies’ critical infrastructure is less 
often considered, and generally only by 
a small number of academics or 
government analysts.  
The collection of performance-
monitoring data is vital in the analysis 
and promotion of infrastructure 
resilience. It allows for operational 
adjustments during crises, and helps 
validate and direct research and 
modeling studies supporting 
preparation and planning for future 
crises. It enables accurate after-action 
analysis of natural disasters and other 
hazards and aids in estimating the level 
of resilience demonstrated by 
infrastructures and the success of steps 
taken to promote resilience. This data is 
also useful in understanding the nature 
and strength of interdependence 
between various infrastructures, which, 
while identifiable with knowledge of a 
system, may only be apparent in their 
true magnitude when systems are 
stressed.  
The choice of appropriate measures 
of infrastructure performance to 
indicate resilience is also important. 
Existing measures of performance are a 
starting point and can be considered in a 
resilience framework (i.e., in Baton 
Rouge, these included such items as 
response times, relative travel time, 
mortality, number of customers without 
phone or electrical service, etc.). These 
types of information are currently 
collected, largely for short term 
operational adjustments (e.g. 
redeployment of personnel) as well as 
longer term performance monitoring. 
This data is, however, not generally 
analyzed from the perspective of 
promoting resilience, and such efforts 
may require new methods of analysis 
outside the realm of infrastructure 
manager expertise. Such efforts may 
include, for instance, complex 
consideration of threatening events, 
interdependences with other 
infrastructures, and impact of human 
behavior on systems performance. In 
this paper, we identified five dimensions 
that infrastructure planners and 
emergency managers might consider in 
their efforts to ensure infrastructure 
resilience in their community. These 
include redundancy of services, 
responsiveness to stressors, elasticity for 
expansion, socially-mediated mitigation, 
and adaptive behavior of human capital.  
In the area of infrastructure 
performance and resilience, simulation-
based analysis, as exemplified in this 
work by CIPDSS, is needed.  Such 
analysis may encompass broad 
perspectives, including detailed 
information on each infrastructure and 
its behavior, as well as interactions 
between infrastructures, and the 
economic, public health, or social effects 
of changes and disruptions. As has been 
demonstrated by this work, 
infrastructure performance data is 
critical to accurate and successful 
modeling of infrastructures and in 
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particularly of interdependences. 
Continued work on both 
interdependency modeling and 
infrastructure performance data 
collection is expected to greatly enhance 
the knowledge base required to increase 
infrastructure resilience.  
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